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Abstract 
Despite the importance of valuing another person’s welfare for prosocial behavior, 
currently we have only a limited understanding of how these values are represented in the 
brain, and more importantly, how they give rise to individual variability in prosociality. 
In the present study, participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while 
they performed a prosocial learning task in which they could choose to benefit 
themselves and/or another person. Choice behavior indicated that participants valued the 
welfare of another person, although less so than they valued their own welfare. Neural 
data revealed a spatial gradient in activity within the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), 
such that ventral parts predominantly represented self-regarding values whereas dorsal 
parts predominantly represented other-regarding values. Importantly, compared to selfish 
individuals, prosocial individuals showed a more gradual transition from self- to other-
regarding value signals in the MPFC and stronger MPFC-striatum coupling when they 
made choices for another person rather than for themselves. The present study provides 
evidence of neural markers reflecting individual differences in human prosociality. 
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Significance Statement 
How do selfish and prosocial brains function differently with regard to valuing the 
welfare of others? The present study addresses this question by combining neuroimaging, 
computational modeling, and an instrumental conditioning paradigm. Contrary to the 
conventional notion of the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) implicated in 
mentalization, we found that it was selfish individuals who showed greater spatial 
segregation between ventral and dorsal MPFC, which encoded self- and other-regarding 
values, respectively. Prosocial individuals, on the other hand, were characterized by 
overlapping representations of self-value and other-value in the ventral MPFC and also 
by stronger functional coupling between MPFC and striatum while representing and 
updating the value of other-regarding choices. These findings provide rigorous scientific 
evidence of neural markers reflecting individual differences in human prosociality. 
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\body 
Ranging from a small act of kindness in daily life to self-sacrificing altruism 
under life-threatening situations, we often observe large individual differences in valuing 
another person’s welfare. This differential valuation process seems to be the key to 
understanding various human prosocial behaviors, which are fundamental to the 
sustainability of human society (1). Yet, the underlying neural mechanisms and their 
relationship to individual differences in prosociality remain unclear. 
Perhaps the most powerful way of assessing how a future outcome is valued is to 
use an instrumental learning paradigm that examines whether the occurrence of a 
response increases when it is followed by that outcome (2). The mechanisms underlying 
this type of learning have been described more formally with a computational model, 
known as the temporal difference (TD) learning model (3-5), which has been used 
successfully to reveal the neuroanatomical substrates of subjective valuation (3,4,6). 
Previous research has further refined the neurobiological model of reinforcement learning 
by emphasizing the specific roles played by the medial frontal cortex and the striatum: 
the medial frontal cortex computes the value of the chosen action while the striatum 
processes reward prediction errors during reinforcement learning (4, 6-9). 
Unlike our current understanding of the valuation process for self-regarding 
choices (3, 6-12), it is much less clear whether learning can also be driven by other-
regarding values, and whether this other-regarding valuation relies on the same 
mechanisms of reinforcement learning as those used for self. Moreover, despite rapidly 
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accumulating research on reward processing in social domains (13-19), the question 
remains of how the neural representation of self- vs. other-regarding values is related to 
individual differences in altruistic behavior.  
In the present research, we designed a novel version of an instrumental learning 
task (i.e., a prosocial learning task), to assess behavioral and neural processes associated 
with self- and other-regarding valuation in a comparable, principled way. In the prosocial 
learning task, participants chose between two alternatives to achieve a higher probability 
of benefitting either themselves and/or another person in the form of reducing the 
duration of exposure to unpleasantly loud noise. Thirty pairs of healthy right-handed 
female college students participated in the study. The scanned participant of each pair 
performed the prosocial learning task (Figure 1). In each trial of the task, participants 
were presented with two options and had to choose one of them. In different conditions, 
the two options were represented by specific fractal images and associated with points 
only for the participant in the scanner (SELF condition), for both participants (BOTH 
condition), or only for the participant outside the scanner (OTHER condition). One of the 
two options always had a higher probability (70%) of yielding points than the other 
(30%). By trial and error the participants in the scanner would learn about these 
probabilities and subsequently choose the option they preferred. Participants were told 
that they would be exposed to unpleasant noise for five minutes after the task, and that 
the points earned in the task would be used to reduce the duration of the noise for 
themselves and/or the paired participant outside the scanner. 
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We predicted that if participants valued others’ welfare, the other-regarding 
outcome (i.e., points earned to reduce the duration of aversive noise for the other) would 
increase their performance above chance level, such that they would earn more points for 
the other participant than if they chose randomly. In line with the idea that avoidance of 
punishment is reinforcing and has been shown to activate similar brain regions as reward 
learning (3), the points earned in the task, which could be used later, just like money, 
were presumed to have appetitive motivational value. Regarding neural representation of 
the chosen value, therefore, we expected a spatial segregation within the MPFC in 
computing self- and other-regarding values, consistent with previous studies showing that 
the ventral and dorsal parts of the MPFC are involved in self- and other-regarding 
processes, respectively (19-25). More importantly, we hypothesized that the degree of 
spatial segregation would provide a neural index of the individual propensity to help 
others. Given that the positive subjective valuation of others’ welfare can lead to 
prosocial decisions (17, 26-29), we expected that decreased segregation would be 
associated with greater prosociality. In addition, we examined whether and how 
corticostriatal communications contribute to individual differences in representing and 
updating self- and other-regarding values. 
 
Behavioral results 
We tested whether participants valued another person’s welfare at all, and found 
that they did. In particular, the proportions of choosing the high-reward probability option 
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in the OTHER condition were significantly higher than chance level (0.5), t(25) = 2.68, p 
< 0.05 (Figure 2A; see SI Appendix, Figure S1 for trial-by-trial learning curves). While 
this finding clearly indicates that participants did learn to help others even when there 
was nothing to be gained for them, there were considerable individual differences in the 
propensity to help. Some individuals showed equal preference for the high probability 
option in the SELF and the OTHER conditions whereas other individuals showed such a 
preference only in the SELF condition. Due to this individual variability, preference for 
the high probability option was weaker, on average in the OTHER condition compared to 
the SELF (ps < 0.05) or the BOTH (ps < 0.05) conditions [Figure 2A; main effect of 
condition: F(2, 50) = 5.97, p < 0.01; pairwise comparisons for SELF vs. BOTH: ns].  
fMRI Results 
Spatial gradient within MPFC for self- vs. other-regarding value computation. We 
hypothesized that the ventral and dorsal subregions of the MPFC would be involved in 
computing self- and other-regarding values, respectively. A minimal requirement to 
support this hypothesis was that the MPFC as a whole would be associated with choice 
values in all conditions. We therefore conducted a parametric modulation analysis using 
subject-specific value parameters estimated by the advantage learning model (see 
Materials and Methods) and found that the MPFC (x = 4, y = 52, z = 8 mm, Z = 3.73) 
was engaged in computing the value of the chosen option at the time of stimulus 
presentation across all three conditions (SI Appendix, Table S1 and Figure S3A). Next, 
we ran the same parametric modulation analysis separately for each condition. These 
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analyses revealed that the chosen value-related MPFC activation clusters in the SELF and 
the OTHER conditions were respectively located somewhat more ventrally and more 
dorsally than the cluster in the BOTH condition (SI Appendix, Table S1 and Figure 
S3B), consistent with our prediction of spatial specificity.  
For a more quantitative examination of this spatial segregation within the MPFC, 
we defined five regions of interest (ROIs) along the ventral-dorsal midline axis. 
Specifically, we obtained a sagittal view of the statistical parametric map from the 
aforementioned parametric modulation analysis with a lenient threshold of p < 0.05 
uncorrected and then selected five equally spaced coordinates spanning the ventral to 
dorsal extent of the MPFC (Figure 3A), similarly to previous research  (30). The 
parameter estimates of the neural activation associated with chosen value at the time of 
stimulus presentation were extracted from the ROIs for each individual. A 2 (condition: 
SELF, OTHER) × 5 (ROI locations) repeated-measures ANOVA showed a clear spatial 
distinction between VMPC and DMPFC in computing values for self- vs. other-regarding 
choices [interaction of condition with ROI locations: F(4, 100) = 4.49, p < 0.005] 
(Figure 3B). The value signal for SELF was stronger in more ventral ROIs, whereas the 
value signal for OTHER was stronger in more dorsal ROIs within the MPFC. Value 
signals for the BOTH condition were dominant in intermediate ROIs, and the interaction 
effect remained significant when we included the BOTH condition in the analysis [F(8, 
200) = 2.28, p < 0.05]. In line with the gradient hypothesis, the linear effect of ROI 
location on condition was also significant [F(1, 25) = 10.13, p < 0.005]. More specifically, 
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the strength of the value signal for self-regarding choices linearly decreased from 
VMPFC to DMPFC [F(1, 25) = 4.81, p < 0.05] whereas the value signal for other-
regarding choices showed the opposite trend [F(1, 25) = 3.10, p = 0.09]. 
Self-other distinction within the MPFC reflects propensity to help others in the 
prosocial learning task. We expected that the spatial pattern of value representations 
within the MPFC would reliably track individual variability in (prosocial) propensity to 
help, as measured by choice behavior in the prosocial learning task. To capture individual 
differences in a categorical manner, we formed two groups (prosocial and selfish) based 
on the parameters estimated by the advantage learning model (see Materials and 
Methods). Figure 2B illustrates the behavioral characteristics of the prosocial and selfish 
individuals in terms of their propensity to choose high reward probability options across 
conditions (see SI Appendix, Figure S1 for the learning curves). Group membership 
(prosocial and selfish) interacted with condition (SELF, BOTH, and OTHER) with 
respect to the proportions of high probability choice [F(2, 46) = 11.78, p < 0.001]. 
Individuals in the prosocial group showed a smaller difference between the SELF and 
OTHER condition than individuals in the selfish group (see SI Appendix, Figures S2 
and S4 for the validation of the categorization).  
To better characterize the effects of prosociality on value representation, we 
conducted a mixed ANOVA with reward-type and ROI location as within-subject factors 
and group membership as a between-subjects factor. We found a significant three-way 
interaction [F(4, 92) = 3.10, p < 0.05], such that the spatial distinction of self- and other-
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regarding value representations was stronger in the selfish group than the prosocial group 
(Figures 3C and 3D). Analyses performed separately for the prosocial and selfish groups 
further supported this finding: The spatial separation of self- and other-regarding value 
signals was only prominent among selfish individuals, [F(4, 36) = 5.37, p < 0.005] but 
not among prosocial individuals [F(4, 56) < 1, ns]. We quantified the degree of spatial 
separation within the MPFC by fitting linear functions to the self- and other-regarding 
value signals along the ventral-dorsal axis for each individual. A between-groups 
comparison of the linear slopes fitted to the spatial gradient revealed that slopes were 
steeper in selfish vs. prosocial individuals [F(1, 23) = 6.72, p < 0.05] (Figure 3E), 
consistent with a greater separation of self- and other-regarding values in selfish 
compared to prosocial individuals. The spatial gradient revealed that the difference 
between selfish and prosocial groups mainly arose in the OTHER condition [F(1, 23) = 
4.015, p = 0.057], that is, the other-regarding value signal was stronger in the DMPFC 
than the VMPFC only in selfish individuals. Such a group difference was not observed in 
the SELF condition [F(1 ,23) < 1, n.s.], where the self-regarding value signal was 
stronger in the VMPFC than the DMPFC for both groups. Control analyses showed that 
the extent of the MPFC activation was not merely associated with performance level (see 
SI Appendix for additional analyses addressing alternative explanations). 
Furthermore, the spatial gradient tracked the choices in the prosocial learning 
task: the slopes of the spatial gradient for self- and other-regarding values correlated 
negatively with the average proportion of choosing high reward probability options in the 
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OTHER condition (r = - 0.55, p < 0.01), and the correlation remained significant after we 
excluded the most extreme value, which could be considered as an outlier (r = - 0.43, p < 
0.05, Figure 3F). That is, participants with greater other-regarding value signals in the 
VMPFC than in the DMPFC were more likely to choose to help their partners in the 
OTHER condition, whereas those with the opposite gradient were more likely to behave 
individualistically (selfishly). The spatial gradient for self-regarding values was not 
associated with the choices in the SELF condition (r = - 0.075).  
Functional connectivity of the MPFC during other- vs. self-regarding choices. It has 
been well established by previous studies that communication between the medial frontal 
regions computing the chosen values and the striatum processing the RPEs plays an 
essential role in updating and maintaining value-related information during reinforcement 
learning (7, 8). We confirmed that activity in the striatum, including the nucleus 
accumbens and part of the caudate and putamen, was correlated with the RPE at the time 
of the outcome presentation phase, irrespective of an individual’s propensity to behave 
prosocially (SI Appendix). We then performed psychophysiological interaction (PPI) 
analyses to test whether and how the individual differences observed in the present study 
are reflected in the pattern of functional connectivity between the MPFC subregions and 
the striatum during other vs. self-regarding choices. We selected the ventral (VMPFC; x 
= 0, y = 56, z = 2; peak voxel computing chosen value for SELF condition), middle 
(MMPFC; x = 4, y = 52, z = 8; peak voxel computing chosen value for both SELF and 
OTHER conditions), and dorsal (DMPFC; x = 2, y = 44, z = 12; peak voxel computing 
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chosen value for OTHER condition) parts of the MPFC as seed regions. Then we 
performed three separate PPI analyses to identify the regions showing differential 
functional coupling with the three seed regions in the OTHER vs. SELF condition at the 
option presentation phase. Finally, we performed two-sample t-tests of the difference 
between selfish and prosocial groups. As expected, we found a significant group 
difference in functional connectivity between the striatum and the VMPFC (x = 16, y = 
20, z = 0, Z = 3.54), MMPFC (x = 6, y = 14, z = 2, Z = 3.36), and DMPFC (x = 14, y = 18, 
z = 4, Z = 4.14) (Figures 4A and B). To better understand these group differences, we 
performed post-hoc ROI analyses and found that the difference between the OTHER vs. 
SELF condition was robust among prosocial individuals, such that the connectivity was 
stronger in the OTHER condition than in the SELF condition for all of the three MPFC 
seeds [all Fs(1, 23) > 9.98, all ps < 0.01] (Figures 4C-E). On the other hand, selfish 
individuals tended to show the opposite patterns, that is, stronger connectivity in the 
SELF than the OTHER condition, although the differences between the two conditions 
were not statistically significant. It is also worth noting that the part of the striatum 
communicating with the DMPFC covered a large area that extended from the nucleus 
accumbens to the dorsal caudate and putamen. By contrast, the regions communicating 
with the MMPFC and VMPFC were more restricted, and the peak voxels were located 
more ventrally than those connected with the DMPFC (SI Appendix, Figures 4A and B; 
Figure S5 and Table S3 for the regions other than the striatum; SI Appendix for 
additional analyses addressing alternative explanations).  
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Mode of decisions for self and other. The difference between prosocial and selfish 
individuals in representing and updating self- and other-regarding values lead us to the 
question of whether the two groups engage in different modes of decision in SELF and 
OTHER conditions. Our response time (RT) data suggested the possibility that additional 
cognitive processes might be required for selfish individuals to make other-regarding 
decisions, because selfish individuals were significantly slower in the OTHER than the 
SELF condition, F(2, 18) = 3.84, p < 0.05 (SI Appendix, Figure S8). Prosocial 
individuals did not show such a difference, F(2, 28) = 0.49, ns. In line with this 
behavioral finding, regions known to be involved in cognitive control, such as the right 
anterior insula extending to the inferior frontal gyrus showed greater activation when 
selfish participants made choices for the other participant than for themselves, whereas 
prosocial individuals showed no significant difference across conditions (AI/IFG; x = 36, 
y = 26, z = -4, Z = 3.65; two-sample t-test for the group difference in the contrast maps of 
OTHER vs. SELF condition at the time of option presentation; SI Appendix, Figure 
S9A; see Table S4 for whole-brain result). This result remained the same even when 
trial-to-trial RTs were included in the analysis (SI Appendix, Figure S10), ruling out the 
possibility that the increased AI/IFG activation during the OTHER condition among 
selfish participants may merely reflect differences in RT. Interestingly, the AI/IFG 
activation was correlated with the average RTs, such that participants with slower RTs in 
the OTHER vs. SELF condition showed greater AI/IFG activation in the OTHER vs. 
SELF condition (r = 0.50, p < 0.05), which remained significant even after controlling for 
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the effect of need for cognition (55). In sum, these findings suggest that the AI/IFG may 
be involved in decision mode switching, which is then indirectly related to additional 
information processing. The RTs and neural responses in the SELF condition were not 
related to performance.  
To further examine how AI/IFG activation influences the corticostriatal 
communication underlying the process of updating and representing other- vs. self-
regarding values, we correlated the AI/IFG activation (i.e., the beta estimates of the 
OTHER vs. SELF contrasts at the option presentation phase) with the MPFC-striatum 
connectivity (i.e., the beta estimates of the PPIs with the MPFC subregions as seeds 
during OTHER vs. SELF trials) across participants. Interestingly, the greater AI/IFG 
activation in the OTHER than the SELF condition, the weaker DMPFC-striatum (r = -
0.48, p = 0.01), MMPFC-striatum (r = -0.47, p = 0.01), and VMPFC-striatum (r = -0.37, 
p = 0.11) coupling in the OTHER vs. SELF condition (SI Appendix, Figure S9B). 
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the neural mechanisms of valuing and representing 
another’s welfare and their relation to an individual’s propensity for prosocial behavior. 
Combined with a computational approach, our prosocial learning task provided a novel 
behavioral measure to quantify individual differences in prosociality and allowed us to 
explore the question that we raised in the beginning: What makes some people more 
prosocial than others and how does our brain enable us to value the welfare of others?  
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Our finding that the spatial specificity for self vs. other-regarding value 
representation within the MPFC was robust only among selfish individuals and was 
attenuated among prosocial individuals supports the idea that prosociality requires a 
shared value representation for self and other (1, 17, 26). Interestingly, closer 
examination of the spatial gradient revealed that the difference between prosocial and 
selfish groups was especially prominent in the VMPFC. This might seem puzzling, 
considering that the VMPFC has been strongly implicated in the processes of self-
relevant information (31-33) and the DMPFC in theory of mind and mentalizing (34-36). 
However, there is converging evidence for functional specialization within the MPFC. 
For example, the VMPFC has been suggested as a domain-general valuation system that 
processes significant and motivating information such as reward (37, 38), and the 
DMPFC as a part of the attentional system that is predominantly involved in cognitively 
demanding tasks such as strategic social inference (37-39). This idea does not necessarily 
contradict the idea that self-relevance is a major factor that distinguishes VMPFC and 
DMPFC (40) because self-relevant information is often most significant and motivating 
(19, 41). Our results suggest that the VMPFC is tightly associated with subjective 
valuation regardless of the choice’s beneficiary (30), whereas the DMPFC is involved in 
more general other-specific processing commonly required for other-regarding choices 
invariant across individuals (22-24, 39, 42, 43). 
Another interesting finding is that the pattern of functional coupling between the 
MPFC subregions computing the values of choices and the striatum encoding RPEs was 
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significantly correlated with individual propensity to help others. In support of this 
finding, many previous studies have reported strong anatomical and functional links 
between MPFC subregions and the striatum, which play a key role in reinforcement 
learning (7, 8, 44). More specifically, recent theoretical work proposed a hierarchical 
model, in which reinforcement learning in vertebrates occurs through multiple 
independent cortico-basal ganglia loops that interact with each other, allowing 
information to propagate mostly from ventral to dorsal levels of the striatum-MPFC loops 
(44). Although the spatial resolution of fMRI is far lower than that of animal 
neurophysiological studies (44), we found a similar spatial segregation between ventral 
and dorsal corticostriatal networks. Our PPI data suggest that prosocial individuals may 
be characterized by active propagation of subjective value signals between the ventral 
and dorsal loops, which could be crucial for maximizing their capacity to represent, 
update, and maintain the value of other-regarding choices. This, in turn, may enable the 
shared value representation for self and other within the MPFC. 
Despite the stronger functional coupling between the striatum and the MPFC 
among prosocial individuals, it appears that selfish individuals required greater cognitive 
effort and control during the OTHER vs. SELF condition, where they had slower RTs 
and showed increased activity in the AI/IFG. Although we cannot completely rule out the 
possibility that the AI/IFG activation may reflect an aversive response to other-regarding 
choices among selfish individuals, the correlation between the AI/IFG activation and the 
average RTs across individuals suggests that additional cognitive processes may be 
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engaged during the OTHER condition. It is also noteworthy that AI/IFG has been 
strongly implicated in cognitive control and self-regulation (45-48). Given that increase 
in AI/IFG activity weakened the MPFC-striatum coupling during choices for others, 
selfish individuals seem to employ additional cognitively demanding processes that 
interrupt the process of prosocial valuation, which may involve signal propagation 
through the MPFC-striatum loops. The exact nature of these additional cognitive 
processes employed by selfish individuals deserves future investigation. 
In summary, the present study revealed that spatial segregation within the MPFC 
in computing values for self- vs. other-regarding choice is critically involved in 
determining individual variability in prosociality. Further, weaker segregation of self- and 
other-regarding value signals in the MPFC and stronger MPFC-striatal coupling are 
associated with being prosocial rather than selfish. Despite having yet to be tested with 
more direct measures of altruism, our findings provide important insights into human 
prosociality/altruism. First, the shared neural representation for self- and other-regarding 
values found among prosocial individuals supports the view that altruism requires value 
extension from self to others, via a process in which another person’s welfare becomes 
valuable (1, 16, 17, 26). Second, the other-regarding valuation process subserved by the 
VMPFC as a part of the corticostriatal network in prosocial individuals emphasizes the 
automatic and intuitive nature of prosocial motivation. This finding is in line with recent 
perspectives that prosociality and morality are rooted in intuition acquired, formed, and 
maintained through socialization (49-52). Third, our findings provide neural evidence of 
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social norms internalized within an individual, which may have evolved to benefit groups 
by promoting prosocial behaviors (53). In conclusion, our present findings shed some 
light on the mystery of human altruism and support the notion that this mystery can be 
better understood by adopting rigorous scientific methods and theoretical frameworks in 
the ripening field of decision neuroscience. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants. Thirty pairs of healthy right-handed female college students participated in 
the experiment. The two participants in each pair were strangers to each other. Half of the 
participants (one participant/pair; mean age: 21.9 years, range 19-29 years) were 
randomly assigned to perform a prosocial learning task in the scanner. Four participants 
were excluded due to excessive head movement or random responses in all the conditions, 
leaving twenty-six participants included in the fMRI analysis. All participants were 
compensated with 30,000KRW (approximately 30 USD). The study protocol was 
approved by the Korea University Institutional Review Board and all participants gave 
written consent to participate before the experiment. 
Prosocial learning task. During the prosocial learning task, participants made choices 
between two fractal images, each of which was associated with different reward 
probabilities (30% vs. 70%) (see SI Appendix). Each trial began with one of three pairs 
of fractal images and each pair of images was associated with one of three different types 
of condition: SELF, BOTH, or OTHER (Figure 1). Participants could earn two points for 
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self and none for other in the SELF condition, one point for self and one point for other in 
the BOTH condition, and none for self and two points for other in the OTHER condition. 
The points earned from ten randomly selected trials across all three conditions were to be 
used to reduce the duration of exposure to stressful noise (i.e., 10 sec per point) for self 
and/or other. Each condition comprised 48 trials, resulting in a total of 144 trials in one 
functional run (about 25 min). The conditions were presented in a pseudo-random order, 
and the conditions and reward probabilities associated with different fractal images were 
counter-balanced across participants.  
Estimation of chosen value and reward prediction error. Chosen value and reward 
prediction error (RPE) for each trial for each individual were estimated by using the 
advantage learning model (3, 4) (see SI Appendix).  
Behavioral measures of individual prosociality. To measure individual differences in 
prosociality within the task, we estimated an experienced magnitude of reward outcomes 
separately for each of the three conditions (see SI Appendix). Applying the conceptual 
framework of social value orientation (54), we grouped participants into a prosocial 
group (N = 15), which valued other-regarding outcomes the same as or more than self-
regarding outcomes, and a selfish group (N = 10), which valued self-regarding outcomes 
more than other-regarding outcomes. One subject who did not value either of the 
outcomes was excluded from the analyses examining group differences. To validate the 
findings that were based on the task-based measure of prosociality with an independent 
measure, we also used participants’ self reports in the social value orientation 
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questionnaire to group them into prosocial (N = 14) and proself (N = 10) groups (53; see 
SI Appendix). This grouping confirmed that the behavioral and fMRI results remained 
the same (SI Appendix, Figures S2 and S4). 
fMRI data acquisition and analysis. Brain images were acquired on a 3T MRI scanner 
(MAGNETOM Tim Trio; Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) at the Korea 
University Brain Imaging Center. T2*-weighted functional images were obtained through 
gradient echo planar image (EPI) with BOLD (Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent) 
contrast (TR = 2000 ms; TE = 30 ms; flip angle = 90°; FOV = 240mm; 80 × 80 matrix; 
36 axial slices; 3 × 3 × 3 mm in-plane resolution). High-resolution T1-weighted structural 
images were also collected (TR = 1900 ms; TE = 2.52 ms; flip angle = 9°; 256 × 256 
matrix; 1 × 1 × 1 mm in-plane resolution). The fMRI data were preprocessed and 
analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London). 
Images were realigned, normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
EPI template, and spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with an 8-mm full width at 
half maximum (FWHM).  
We created a first-level general linear model (GLM) with parametric modulators 
(see SI Appendix). Trial-by-trial fluctuations of subject-specific chosen values and RPEs 
were estimated by using the advantage learning model and entered into the first-level 
GLM model as parameters that modulated the hemodynamic responses at the time of 
option presentation and outcome presentation, respectively. Linear contrasts of regression 
coefficients for the parametric modulators of value and for RPE were computed and 
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subjected to a random effects group-level analysis using one-way ANOVA with 
condition (i.e., SELF, BOTH, OTHER) as a repeated-measures factor. Spatial gradients 
in self- and other-regarding value representations within the MPFC were quantified by 
extracting parameter estimates from five anatomical ROIs (spheres with a 4-mm radius) 
along the midline axis from VMPFC to DMPFC within the activation cluster correlating 
with the value parameters (30). For each ROI, we extracted the value parameter estimates 
for each condition, which were then entered into a repeated-measures one-way ANOVA. 
In addition, we fitted a linear slope to the OTHER vs. SELF contrasts across the five 
ROIs along the ventral-to-dorsal axis for each individual to estimate the degree of spatial 
gradient within the MPFC in terms of other- vs. self-regarding valuation. 
Differential functional connectivity with the MPFC subregions during other- 
compared to self-regarding choices at option presentation was assessed with a PPI 
analysis. The MMPFC seed was the peak voxel from the region (x = 4, y = 52, z = 8) that 
was found to be correlated with the value parameters from all three conditions in the 
parametric modulation analysis; the VMPFC (x = 0, y = 56, z = 2) and DMPFC (x = 2, y 
= 44, z = 12) seeds were the peak voxels found to be correlated with the value parameters 
from SELF and OTHER conditions, respectively; the OTHER vs. SELF contrast at the 
time of option presentation was included as a psychological variable. Individual PPI 
maps were entered into a group-level two-sample t-test comparing prosocial and selfish 
groups.  
  
 
 
 
22 
 Additionally, to examine whether prosocial and selfish individuals utilize 
different modes of decision for self vs. other, we contrasted neural responses to the 
presentation of options between SELF and OTHER conditions. The contrast maps of 
SELF vs. OTHER and OTHER vs. SELF at option presentation were entered into 
random-effects group-level two-sample t-tests comparing prosocial and selfish groups. 
All statistical thresholds were set to p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons, 
using a cluster threshold determined at an uncorrected p < 0.001 by Monte Carlo 
simulations implemented in AlphaSim within AFNI software (http://afni.nih.gov/afni; 55) 
for each search volume described below. To assess value signals in the MPFC, we 
formed an a priori anatomical search volume that included superior medial frontal cortex 
and anterior cingulate based on the AAL atlas (57) as implemented in the 
WFU_PickAtlas toolbox (www.ansir.wfubmc.edu; 58). In searching for RPE signals in 
the striatum and for the PPI analyses, we created an a priori search volume including 
bilateral caudate and putamen (extending to nucleus accumbens), based on the AAL atlas. 
For the group comparison analyses of SELF vs. OTHER and OTHER vs. SELF contrasts 
at option presentation, the correction was confined within the whole-brain because we 
had no specific hypothesis for this analysis.  
 
Author Contributions. SS, PNT, SL, GH, EF, and HK conceived and designed the 
experiments. SS and DJ performed the experiments. SS and HK analyzed the data. SS 
and HK contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools. SS, PNT, and HK wrote the paper. 
  
 
 
 
23 
 
Acknowledgments. This work was supported by a research grant from Korea University 
(SS), a National Research Foundation of Korea Grant from the Korean Government 
(NRF-2012-S1A3-A2033375: SS and HK; 2006-2005110: HK) and the Swiss National 
Science Foundation (PP00P1_128574 and PP00P1_150739: PNT; CRSII3_141965: EF 
and PNT) 
 
References 
1. Batson CD (2011) Altruism in humans (Oxford University Press, New York). 
2. Thorndike EL (1911) Animal intelligence: Experimental studies (Macmillan, New 
York). 
3. Kim H, Shimojo S, O'Doherty JP (2006) Is avoiding an aversive outcome 
rewarding? Neural substrates of avoidance learning in the human brain. Plos Biol 
4:e233. 
4. O'Doherty JP, Dayan P, Schultz J, Deichmann R, Friston K, Dolan, RJ (2004) 
Dissociable roles of ventral and dorsal striatum in instrumental conditioning. 
Science 304:452-454. 
5. Sutton RS, Barto AG (1998) Introduction to reinforcement learning (MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA). 
6. Hare TA, O'Doherty J, Camerer CF, Schultz W, Rangel A (2008) Dissociating the 
role of the orbitofrontal cortex and the striatum in the computation of goal values 
and prediction errors. J Neurosci 28:5623-5630. 
7. Haber SN, Knutson B (2009) The reward circuit: linking primate anatomy and 
human imaging. Neuropsychopharmacology 35:4-26. 
8. Haruno M, Kawato M (2006) Heterarchical reinforcement-learning model for 
integration of multiple cortico-striatal loops: fMRI examination in stimulus-
action-reward association learning. Neural Networks 19:1242-1254. 
9. Kim, H, Adolphs, R, O'Doherty, JP, and Shimojo, S (2007). Temporal isolation of 
neural processes underlying face preference decisions. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 
104:18253-18258. 
10. Schultz W (1998) Predictive reward signal of dopamine neurons. J Neurophysiol 
80:1-27. 
  
 
 
 
24 
11. Lebreton M, Jorge S, Michel V, Thirion B, Pessiglione M (2009) An automatic 
valuation system in the human brain: evidence from functional neuroimaging. 
Neuron 64:431-439. 
12. Plassmann H, O'Doherty J, Rangel A (2007) Orbitofrontal cortex encodes 
willingness to pay in everyday economic transactions. J Neurosci 27:9984-9988. 
13. Behrens TE, Hunt LT, Rushworth MFS (2009) The computation of social 
behavior. Science 324:1160-1164. 
14. Burke CJ, Tobler PN, Baddeley M, Schultz W (2010) Neural mechanisms of 
observational learning. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 107:14431-14436. 
15. Christopoulos GI, King-Casas B (in press) With you or against you: Social 
orientation dependent learning signals guide actions made for others. NeuroImage. 
16. Fehr E, Camerer CF (2007) Social neuroeconomics: the neural circuitry of social 
preferences. Trends Cogn Sci 11:419-427. 
17. Harbaugh WT, Mayr U, Burghart DR (2007) Neural responses to taxation and 
voluntary giving reveal motives for charitable donations. Science 316: 1622-1625. 
18. Izuma K, Saito DN, Sadato N (2008) Processing of social and monetary rewards 
in the human striatum. Neuron 58:284-294. 
19. Seid-Fatemi A, Tobler PN (in press) Efficient learning mechanisms hold in the 
social domain and are implemented in the medial prefrontal cortex. Soc Cogn 
Affect Neurosci.  
20. Chang SWC, Gariepy JF, Platt ML (2013) Neuronal reference frames for social 
decisions in primate frontal cortex. Nat Neurosci 16:243-250. 
21. Denny BT, Kober H, Wager TD, Ochsner KN (2012) A Meta-analysis of 
functional neuroimaging studies of self- and other judgments reveals a spatial 
gradient for mentalizing in medial prefrontal cortex. J Cognitive Neurosci 
24:1742-1752. 
22. Mitchell JP, Macrae CN, Banaji MR (2006) Dissociable medial prefrontal 
contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others. Neuron 50:655-663. 
23. Moran JM, Lee SM, Gabrieli JDE (2010) Dissociable neural systems supporting 
knowledge about human character and appearance in ourselves and others. J 
Cognitive Neurosci 23:2222-2230. 
24. Qin P, Northoff G (2011) How is our self related to midline regions and the 
default-mode network? NeuroImage 57:1221-1233. 
25. Saxe R, Moran JM, Scholz J, Gabrieli J (2006) Overlapping and non-overlapping 
brain regions for theory of mind and self reflection in individual subjects. Soc 
Cogn Affect Neurosci 1:229-234. 
26. Hare TA, Camerer CF, Knoepfle DT, O'Doherty JP, Rangel A (2010) Value 
computations in ventral medial prefrontal cortex during charitable decision 
making incorporate input from regions involved in social cognition. J Neurosci 
30:583-590. 
  
 
 
 
25 
27. Moll J, Krueger F, Zahn R, Pardini M, De Oliveira-Souza R, Grafman J (2006) 
Human fronto-mesolimbic networks guide decisions about charitable donation. 
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 103:15623-15628. 
28. Shenhav A, Greene JD (2010) Moral judgments recruit domain-general valuation 
mechanisms to integrate representations of probability and magnitude. Neuron 
67:667-677. 
29. Tricomi E, Rangel A, Camerer CF, O'Doherty JP (2010) Neural evidence for 
inequality-averse social preferences. Nature 463:1089-1091. 
30. Nicolle A, Klein-Flügge MC, Hunt LT, Vlaev I, Dolan RJ, Behrens TE (2012) An 
agent independent axis for executed and modeled choice in medial prefrontal 
cortex. Neuron 75:1114-1121. 
31. Heatherton TF, Wyland CL, Macrae CN, Demos KE, Denny BT, Kelley WM 
(2006) Medial prefrontal activity differentiates self from close others. Soc Cogn 
Affect Neurosci 1:18-25. 
32. Northoff G, Heinzel A, de Greck M, Bermpohl F, Dobrowolny H, Panksepp J 
(2006) Self-referential processing in our brain—A meta-analysis of imaging 
studies on the self. NeuroImage 31:440-457. 
33. Sul S, Choi I, Kang P (2012) Cultural modulation of self-referential brain activity 
for personality traits and social identities. Soc Neurosci 7:280-291. 
34. Frith CD, Frith U (1999) Interacting minds--a biological basis. Science 286:1692-
1695. 
35. Hampton AN, Bossaerts P, O'Doherty JP (2008) Neural correlates of mentalizing-
related computations during strategic interactions in humans. Proc Natl Acad Sci 
USA 105:6741-6746. 
36. Saxe, R (2006) Uniquely human social cognition. Curr Opin Neurobiol 16:235-
239. 
37. Bartra O, McGuire JT, and Kable JW (2013) The valuation system: A coordinate-
based meta-analysis of BOLD fMRI experiments examining neural correlates of 
subjective value. NeuroImage 76:412-427. 
38. Bzdok D, Langner R, Schilbach L, Engemann DA, Laird AR, Fox PT, Eickhoff S 
(2013) Segregation of the human medial prefrontal cortex in social cognition. 
Front in Hum Neurosci 7. 
39. Seo H, Cai X, Donahue CH, Lee D (2014) Neural correlates of strategic reasoning 
during competitive games. Science 346:340-343. 
40. Wagner DD, Haxby JV, Heatherton TF (2012) The representation of self and 
person knowledge in the medial prefrontal cortex. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Cogn Sci 
3:451-470. 
41. Verplanken B, Holland RW (2002) Motivated decision making: Effects of 
activation and self-centrality of values on choices and behavior. J Pers Soc 
Psychol 82:434-447. 
  
 
 
 
26 
42. Jung D, Sul S, and Kim H (2013) Dissociable neural processes underlying risky 
decisions for self versus other. Front in Neurosci 7:15. 
doi:10.3389/fnins.2013.00015 
43. Kang P, Lee J, Sul S, Kim H (2013) Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex activity 
predicts the accuracy in estimating others’ preferences. Front in Hum Neurosci 
7:686. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00686. 
44. Yin HH, Knowlton BJ (2006) The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation. Nat 
Rev Neurosci 7:464-476. 
45. Aron AR, Durston S, Eagle DM, Logan GD, Stinear CM, Stuphorn V (2007) 
Converging evidence for a fronto-basal-ganglia network for inhibitory control of 
action and cognition. J Neurosci 27:11860-11864. 
46. Corbetta M, Shulman GL (2002) Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven 
attention in the brain. Nat Rev Neurosci 3:201-215. 
47. Heatherton TF (2011) Neuroscience of self and self-regulation. Annu Rev Psychol 
62:363-390. 
48. Sridharan D, Levitin DJ, Menon V (2008) A critical role for the right fronto-
insular cortex in switching between central-executive and default-mode networks. 
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 105:12569-12574. 
49. Greene JD, Paxton JM (2009) Patterns of neural activity associated with honest 
and dishonest moral decisions. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106:12506-12511. 
50. Rand DG, Greene JD, Nowak MA (2012) Spontaneous giving and calculated 
greed. Nature 489:427-430. 
51. Haidt J (2007) The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science 316:998-1002. 
52. Sauer H (2012) Educated intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral 
judgement. Philos Explor 15:255-275. 
53. Sober E, Wilson DS (1998) Unto Others: the evolution and psychology of 
unselfish behavior (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). 
54. Van Lange PAM, De Bruin EMN, Otten W, Joireman JA (1997) Development of 
prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: Theory and preliminary 
evidence. J Pers Soc Psychol 73:733-746. 
55. Cacioppo JT, Petty RE, Feng Kao C (1984) The efficient assessment of need for 
cognition. J Pers Assess 48:306-307. 
56. Cox RW (1996) AFNI: software for analysis and visualization of functional 
magnetic resonance neuroimages. Comput Biomed Res 29:162-173. 
57. Tzourio-Mazoyer N, Landeau B, Papathanassiou D, Crivello F, Etard O, Delcroix 
N, Mazoyer B, Joliot M (2002) Automated anatomical labeling of activations in 
SPM using a macroscopic anatomical parcellation of the MNI MRI single-subject 
brain. NeuroImage 15:273-289. 
58. Maldjian JA, Laurienti PJ, Kraft RA, Burdette JH (2003) An automated method 
for neuroanatomic and cytoarchitectonic atlas-based interrogation of fMRI data 
sets. NeuroImage 19:1233-1239. 
  
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1 Prosocial learning task and within-subject experimental conditions. Only 
rewarded outcomes are shown. 
 
Figure 2 Behavioral results. A: Proportions of choosing high reward probability (HRP) 
options in SELF, BOTH, and OTHER conditions. B: Comparison between prosocial and 
selfish. All error bars indicate 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 3 Regions representing the value of the chosen option. A: Definition of ROIs. B: 
Spatial gradient for self- and other- regarding value computation within the MPFC. 
Dotted lines indicate linear fits of the spatial gradient for SELF (red) and OTHER (blue) 
conditions. C-D: Spatial gradient for self- and other- regarding value computation within 
the MPFC, depicted separately for prosocial (N = 15) and selfish groups (N = 10) as 
defined by the advantage learning model (see SI Appendix). Dotted lines indicate linear 
fittings of the spatial gradient for SELF (red) and OTHER (blue) conditions. Negative 
slope indicates greater value signal in VMPFC than DMPFC, and vice versa. E: Linear 
slopes of the spatial gradient within the MPFC in SELF and OTHER conditions among 
prosocial and selfish participants. Negative slope indicates greater value signal in 
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VMPFC than DMPFC, and vice versa. F: Participants with greater gradient showed a less 
clear preference for the high probability option in the OTHER condition. The result 
remained significant after excluding the subject with the strongest gradient (open circle, 
correlation coefficient without this data point is reported in brackets). 
 
Figure 4 Comparison of prosocial vs. selfish individuals for functional connectivity (PPI) 
with the VMPFC, MMPFC, and DMPFC as seed regions during OTHER vs. SELF 
conditions. A: Result of two-sample t-tests for the PPIs with the VMPFC and DMPFC as 
seed regions masked with the striatum ROI. Different seed regions are color coded (Red: 
VMPFC, blue: DMPFC, magenta: VMPFC ∩ DMPFC; for illustration purposes, p < 
0.005, uncorrected). B: Result of two-sample t-tests for all three PPIs masked with the 
striatum ROI. Voxels connected with the VMPFC, MMPFC, and DMPFC as seed regions 
are color coded with red, green, and blue, respectively (note that the regions connected 
with VMPFC and MPFC largely overlap; for illustration purposes, p < 0.005, 
uncorrected). C-E: Average connectivity strength between the MPFC subregions and the 
striatum in SELF and OTHER condition closely matched the differential prosociality of 
the prosocial and the selfish group.  
